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Abstract
Background: In the complex domain of medical decision making, reasoning under uncertainty can 
benefit from supporting tools. Automated decision support tools often build upon mathematical 
models, such as Bayesian networks. These networks require probabilities which often have to be 
assessed by experts in the domain of application. Probability response scales can be used to  support 
the assessment process. W e compare assessments obtained with different types of response scale.
Methods: General practitioners (GPs) gave assessments on and preferences for three different 
probability response scales: a numerical scale, a scale with only verbal labels, and a combined verbal- 
numerical scale we had designed ourselves. Standard analyses of variance were performed.
Results: No differences in assessments over the three response scales were found. Preferences 
for type of scale differed: the less experienced GPs preferred the verbal scale, the most 
experienced preferred the numerical scale, with the groups in between having a preference for the 
combined verbal-numerical scale.
Conclusion: We conclude that all three response scales are equally suitable for supporting 
probability assessment. The combined verbal-numerical scale is a good choice for aiding the 
process, since it offers numerical labels to those who prefer numbers and verbal labels to those 
who prefer words, and accommodates both more and less experienced professionals.
Background
Reasoning under uncertainty is common practice in the 
medical field. Diagnoses and prognoses are always made 
in the face of uncertainty, for example about the exact 
pathogenic processes underlying some observed relation 
between symptom and disease. In addition, most diag­
nostic tests are not 100% reliable, resulting in uncertainty 
as to the true presence or absence of the disease tested for. 
On top of that, the effects of treatment may differ per
patient and cannot be predicted with certainty. Clinical 
decision making is, in short, a complex task which could 
benefit from supporting tools.
Support may for example be provided by the increasingly 
recommended 'threshold approach' [1]. This approach 
defines two thresholds. The first threshold indicates the 
decision boundary between no treatment and testing. If 
the clinician's estimate of the probability of the presence
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of a disease falls below this threshold, no treatment is 
given. The second threshold is the boundary between test­
ing and treating. Probability estimates of the presence of a 
disease which fall between these two thresholds dictate 
performing additional diagnostic tests, and estimates 
which are above the second threshold indicate that treat­
ment should be started right away. The approach is only 
valid if the physician's estimate is a true probability, rea­
sonably accurate and unbiased. It is well-known, how­
ever, that humans are poor probability estimators [2] and 
that physicians are no exception [3,4]. This observation 
can be partially explained by 'support theory' [5], which is 
based on the idea that subjective probabilities are not true 
probabilities of events in a mathematical sense, but that 
they reflect how much support people have for different 
descriptions of the events. As a result, subjective probabil­
ity estimates have been shown to suffer from unpacking 
effects and subadditivity. The typical unpacking effect 
refers to the phenomenon that when an hypothesis is 
unpacked into a number of more detailed hypotheses, 
then the sum of the probabilities assigned to the more 
detailed descriptions exceeds the probability estimated for 
the 'packed' hypothesis. When the sum of the probabili­
ties assigned to all hypotheses exceeds a 100%, this over­
estimation of the true probabilities is called subadditivity. 
It has been shown that probability estimates provided by 
physicians are also prone to the unpacking effect [6,7], 
which "questions the applicability of the threshold 
approach if the physicians are not given guidance, explicit 
tools and formal training in probability estimation" ([7], 
p. 763).
Different methods are available to support experts in 
assessing probability judgments (for an overview see e.g. 
[8-10]). However, in constructing a Bayesian network as 
part of a decision support system to aid physicians in 
selecting a suitable treatment for patients with oesopha­
geal cancer, we found that none of the standard probabil­
ity elicitation methods seemed to work (cf. below: 
Context). We therefore designed our own method [11]. A 
major ingredient of this method is the use of one proba­
bility scale with both verbal and numerical labels (see Fig­
ure 1a below), which is similar to but differs from 
methods proposed by others (e.g. [12]), who provide 
both a verbal and a numerical scale but separately. The 
method, including the double scale, has since been used 
for eliciting the required probabilities in a number of real­
istic applications of decision support systems, both in the 
medical field [11,13,14] as well as in other domains 
[15,16], yet a more extensive validation of the scale is still 
called for. In a previous between-subject study, we evalu­
ated our verbal-numerical probability scale with students 
as subjects, comparing the ease of use of and accuracy of 
assessments on our verbal-numerical scale against a 
purely numerical scale [17]. In the study reported in the
current paper, we had physicians as subjects (general prac­
titioners (GPs)), and we included a scale with only verbal 
labels. We were interested in: their preferences in use of 
the three scales, differences in the assessments, confidence 
in assessments with the three scales, and whether or not 
the use of a response scale affected the unpacking effect 
described above.
History o f  the verbal-numerical probability scale
Our personal experiences with eliciting probabilities 
using our verbal-numerical probability scale were very 
good [11]. However, anyone who considers using our 
double scale, should be familiar with its underlying ideas. 
For this reason we review its design, initial use and first 
evaluation.
Context
The verbal-numerical probability scale was designed as 
part of a probability elicitation method for the fast assess­
ment of 4000 point probabilities required for the con­
struction of a real-life Bayesian network in the domain of 
oesophageal cancer (for details on the network and its 
construction we refer to [11]). Bayesian networks are 
mathematical models that capture a joint probability dis­
tribution over a set of variables that are relevant in the 
domain of application [18], and are popular in the medi­
cal domain (see e.g. [19-22]). Bayesian networks allow for 
the computation of any prior or posterior probability of 
interest, using efficient algorithms that basically imple­
ment Bayes' rule.
The numerical probabilities required for a network's spec­
ification can be easily established from a very large, rich 
and reliable data set. However, such data sets are rare and 
often do not allow the reliable assessment of the typically
Figure!
The probability scales: The verbal-numerical (a), the verbal 
(b) and the numerical (c) probability scale.
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large number of specific probabilities that are required. As 
a result, some or all of the probabilities will have to be 
assessed by experts in the domain of application [23], 
something they are often reluctant to do because they do 
not feel familiar enough with the concept of probability 
or they find it difficult to attach a number to their beliefs 
[24]. This is exactly the problem we ran into, and none of 
the standard elicitation methods could help us overcome 
it. Indirect methods, such as lotteries, proved to be too 
complex and too time-consuming for eliciting the 4000 
probabilities. Neither did our experts appreciate direct 
elicitation methods, such as a numerical scale with 
labelled anchors, although these are easy to understand 
and use and therefore less time-consuming. In this they 
agree with many others who, except in situations where 
the odds are objectively measurable, feel more at ease with 
verbal probability expressions than with numbers (e.g. 
[3,25-27]). For a detailed and comprehensive survey of 
the large body of literature on the subject of verbal prob­
ability expressions, see [28], or [29]. Since our primary 
interest was in fast and coherent elicitation, possibly later 
to be followed by more fine-grained assessments where 
necessary, we set out to design a probability scale with ver­
bal labels as anchors to accommodate our experts, and 
numerical labels to inform the experts how their assess­
ments would be translated to the point probabilities we 
required for the specification of our Bayesian network. In 
a later stage, we could use sensitivity analyses [30] to 
determine which assessments possibly needed refinement 
to ensure accurate behaviour of the final network.
Design o f  the scale
The design of the verbal-numerical probability scale is 
described in detail in [28]. Briefly: we conducted four 
studies to indirectly obtain a relation between verbal 
expressions and numerical interpretations of these expres­
sions. Based on the results of these studies we constructed 
the scale shown in Figure 1a. It is a continuous scale, to 
allow subjects to indicate any degree of probability. In 
addition, the verbal probability labels are not placed in 
alignment with the numerical anchors, since the verbal 
expressions should not be taken to be in one-to-one cor­
respondence with particular numbers, but rather as a set 
of labels with a stable rank-ordering, covering the whole 
probability continuum.
With this elicitation method, which included the verbal- 
numerical probability scale, the experts involved were 
able to give their assessments at a rate of 150 to 175 per 
hour. The experts indicated that they found the presence 
of both numerical and verbal labels next to the scale quite 
helpful. They had used words as well as numbers when 
thinking about their assessments, depending on how 
familiar they had felt with the situation to be assessed: the
more uncertain they had felt, the more they had been 
inclined to think in verbal terms.
This study
The aim of the current study was to extend our findings to 
a more realistic setting, with experts assessing probabili­
ties for situations they encounter on a daily basis. We used 
three different probability response scales: 1) our 'double' 
verbal-numerical response scale; 2) a 'numerical' scale 
with numerical labels only, the labels being the same as 
the numerical labels on the double scale; and 3) a 'verbal' 
scale with only the verbal labels taken from the double 
scale (see Figure 1a, b and 1c). Using a within-subject 
design, we sought to provide an answer to the following 
questions: 1. which scale do GPs prefer?; 2. does the type 
of scale affect GPs' assessments and their confidence in 
these assessments?; and 3. does the type of scale influence 
unpacking effects?
The fact that people have been found to prefer the use of 
words to convey uncertainty was one of the reasons for us 
to include verbal labels on our probability response scale. 
As this observation also holds for physicians (see e.g. 
[3,26,27]) and is conform the observations from our first 
evaluation study, we predict that our subjects prefer the 
double scale to the numerical scale. We included a verbal 
scale in this study for the sake of completeness, but we 
expect that that particular scale gives the subjects too little 
to go by. For this same reason we predict that the assess­
ments given on the verbal scale will differ from those 
given on the double scale or the numerical scale, but that 
the vagueness provided by the verbal scale will increase 
the subjects' confidence in their assessments. Given our 
previous experiences, we expect no difference in assess­
ments between the double scale and the numerical scale, 
but do expect more confident assessments with the dou­
ble scale. To the best of our knowledge, the studies that 
reveal the unpacking effect (e.g. [6,7,31]) have asked sub­
jects to give probability assessments without providing 
any support. We expect that the use of a probability 
response scale as supporting tool will not take away the 
unpacking effect, but hopefully the effect will be 
decreased.
Methods
Participants
We purchased, from an institute for primary care, a list of 
300 randomly selected addresses of Dutch practising Gen­
eral Practitioners (GPs). We sent these GPs a letter intro­
ducing our study and the request to participate, together 
with a questionnaire and a stamped return envelope. We 
did not offer any payment. We reassured the GPs that their 
answers would be analysed anonymously.
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Materials
Vignettes
We prepared 15 descriptions of common medical situa­
tions, each accompanied by probability questions con­
cerning diagnostic, prognostic, or therapeutic alternatives. 
These vignettes were reviewed by two very experienced 
GPs (more than 20 years in practice), who judged their 
familiarity and plausibility.
The first three vignettes required the assessment of proba­
bilities for alternative, mutually exclusive and exhaustive, 
diagnoses. We will refer to these as the multiple diagnoses 
vignettes. Each of these three multiple diagnoses vignettes 
had two versions, a short version and a long version (see 
Additional file 1, first three vignettes). The short version 
asked for the assessment of probabilities for two alterna­
tive diagnoses and the option 'other'; in the long, 
unpacked version, this 'other' option was replaced by 
three additional diagnoses plus the option 'other'. This 
manipulation is similar to the one used in fault tree stud­
ies in the area of analysing the fallibility of complex sys­
tems (cf. [32]), but has fixed options to study possible 
unpacking effects. Each vignette described a medical situ­
ation followed by the question: "Given that the patient 
has only one of the following illnesses, how likely do you 
think that illness is?", after which followed either the 
short or the long list of options. The remaining twelve 
vignettes each required the assessment of only a single 
probability (see Additional file 1, vignettes 4 through 15). 
We will refer to these as the simple vignettes. They con­
cerned daily encountered medical situations together with 
probability assessment questions.
Each vignette displayed one of the three probability 
response scales for each probability to be assessed, that is,
3 or 6 scales for each of the multiple diagnoses vignettes 
and 1 scale for each simple vignette. Only one type of 
scale was used per vignette, the verbal, numerical or dou­
ble type, depending on the version of the questionnaire.
Questionnaires
Each questionnaire started with the three multiple diag­
noses vignettes, displaying a different type of response 
scale with each vignette. We rotated presentation order of 
the scales to counteract order effects, thus one third of the 
GPs assessed the first vignette on a verbal scale, one third 
started with a double scale and one third with the numer­
ical scale. Observing that there are six possible combina­
tions of the short and long versions of the three multiple 
diagnoses vignettes (excluding combinations of only 
short versions, or only long versions), we thus arrived at
18 different versions of the questionnaire for the first 
three vignettes. Each of these versions in addition con­
tained the 12 simple vignettes, four with the verbal scale, 
four with the numerical scale and four with the double
scale, again rotating presentation order in the different 
versions.
Immediately below the first vignette on page one of the 
questionnaire, we presented the statement "This scale was 
very usable for indicating my assessment"; with yes, unde­
cided or no as response options. This question enabled us 
to establish a primary reaction to usefulness of the scale, 
not influenced by having seen the other scales. Moreover, 
since different groups of GPs were presented with differ­
ent scales first, we were able to compare these initial eval­
uations between subjects.
For each of the 15 vignettes we included a question about 
the GP's confidence in his/her probability assessment(s). 
Confidence was to be indicated on a horizontal line with 
complete/100% at one end and no/0% at the other.
On the final page of the questionnaire we printed the 
question: "If you were asked to assess another 500 situa­
tions similar to the ones you just assessed, which scale 
would you prefer to use?", where participants could tick 
verbal, verbal plus numerical, or numerical. We left room 
for remarks, and asked for their gender, year of birth and 
years of practice as GP.
Data preparation
All probability and confidence assessments were meas­
ured with a ruler, anchored at 0 at the lowest and 100 at 
the highest point. For the three multiple diagnoses 
vignettes, the short lists (packed version) each contain 
two alternative diagnoses, and the option 'other'; we will 
denote these options by A, B, and O. In the long lists, the 
first two diagnoses were exactly the same as the first two 
in the short lists: A and B. The four remaining options in 
the long lists should therefore together be equally proba­
ble as the option 'other' of the short lists. For our analyses, 
we sum the probability assessments for these latter four 
options from the long lists and take that sum as the assess­
ment for the compound option O in the unpacked ver­
sion.
Results
Participants
Eight questionnaires were returned uncompleted, either 
because the addressee had moved (4) or because the GP 
did not have the time or motivation to participate (4). 
After four weeks and a reminder, we had received 86 com­
pleted questionnaires: a response rate of 29%. For the 
returned questionnaires we found close to equal numbers 
of respondents per version.
Of the 86 GPs who responded, 27 were women, 57 were 
men and two GPs had not given their gender. The women 
had a mean age of 47 years (SD = 7.3) and the men of 50
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years (SD = 6.9). The men had a mean of 19 years (SD =
8.4) of practice as a GP, and the women 15 years (SD =
7.4).
Usability and preference
As indicated on the first page of the questionnaire, i.e. 
after they had assessed one multiple diagnoses vignette 
with one of the three scales, every participant thought 
their scale was quite usable, whether it was the verbal 
scale, the double, or the numerical scale (70, 73 and 74% 
'yes' answers to the usability question for the three scales, 
respectively). We checked whether this appreciation of the 
scale presented first biased participants in their ultimate 
preference: would participants who had started out with 
one scale like that scale most in the end, as indicated on 
the last page in answer to the question which scale they 
would prefer to use if they were asked to assess another 
500 situations? Table 1 shows that this was not the case 
(x2(6) = 9.511, p = .147). Thus the first scale used did not 
bias preferences. Table 1 also shows that there was no gen­
eral preference for one of the three scales as indicated on 
this final question: the verbal scale was preferred by 20 
participants, 26 participants preferred the double scale 
and 34 participants the numerical scale. These preferences 
did not differ significantly (x2(2) = 3.7, p = .157). Gender 
did not affect preference either (x2(2) = .965, p = .617).
We did find differences when we took years of experience 
of the participant into account. We divided the GPs in 
four almost equally sized experience-groups. As shown in 
Table 2, the differences in preference were significant 
(x2(6) = 14.856, p = .021). The least experienced group 
preferred words, the middle groups preferred the double 
scale, and the most experienced GPs preferred numbers.
Probability and confidence assessments
We analysed the relations between probability assess­
ments and scale type for the twelve simple vignettes. We 
found that for none of the twelve vignettes did the type of 
scale used result in significantly different assessments, see 
Table 3. Neither was there a trend for assessments to be 
consistently higher or lower on one scale than on the 
other scales.
For the simple vignettes, confidence was generally quite 
high, ranging from a mean of 72 to 89, with SDs between
12 and 20, see Table 3. They were nowhere significantly 
different from each other for the same vignette with the 
different scales.
Agreement among GPs both in their probability ratings 
and in their confidence ratings for the twelve vignettes was 
significant, but not impressive: Kendall's coefficient for 
concordance had the value W = .52 for the probability rat­
ings, and only W = .24 for the confidence ratings (in both 
cases df = 11, p < .00).
We found that neither age nor experience nor gender was 
related to the probability assessments or to the confidence 
assessments with any of the three types of scale.
Subadditivity and unpacking effects
With the three multiple diagnoses vignettes, participants 
had to assess probabilities for an entire distribution of 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses, that is, per 
vignette the assessed probabilities should sum to 100%. 
In addition, the assessments for the options A, B and O in 
the short, packed, versions should be equal to the respec­
tive assessments for the options A, B and the compound 
O in the long, unpacked, version. There is subadditivity if 
the estimates for options A, B and O add up to more than 
100%. There is an unpacking effect if the probability 
assessment for the compound option O in the long list is 
higher than that for the O option in the short list.
We see subadditivity with all three multiple diagnoses 
vignettes, and both with a short and with a long list of 
options, regardless of the response scale used. For each 
vignette a 2 (List: long or short) x 3 (Scale: verbal, double 
or numerical) x 3 (Option A, B or O) ANOVA was per­
formed, with list and scale as between subjects factors and 
option as within subject factor. These analyses showed 
that with all vignettes there were significant differences 
depending on whether the list was long or short (vignette 
1: F(1,79) = 27.908, p = .000; vignette 2: F(1,78) = 39.272, 
p = .000; vignette 3: F(1,78) = 48.316, p = .000). Thus sub­
additivity was significantly more apparent after unpack­
ing. We observe from Table 4 that the average assessments
Tab le  1 : F irst and pre ferred  scale: N u m b e r  o f participants w ith  th e  first scale used and th e ir  p re ferred  scale
first used verbal
Preference
double numerical missing total
Verbal 6 15 1 1 1 33
Double 7 4 1 1 4 26
numerical 7 7 12 1 27
Total 20 26 34 6 86
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Tab le  2: Experience and preference: N um bers o f participants per experience-group w ho stated a preference (n : 
preferred  scale
Preference
80), and their
years of experience verbal double numerical total
2-11 11 5 6 22
12-18 5 10 9 24
19-25 0 7 10 17
26-30 4 4 9 17
Total 20 26 34 80
given for the A and B options are comparable per response 
scale and vignette. The difference in subadditivity between 
the short and long versions is therefore purely due to 
unpacking effects, resulting in a more substantial overesti­
mation of the probabilities assessed for the O option in 
the long list than in the short list.
In addition, we found for only vignette 3 that the extent of 
subadditivity due to unpacking significantly depended on 
the scale used (F(2,78) = 2.84, p = .045). It was strongest 
with the verbal scale and weakest for the numerical scale, 
the double scale falling in between. For the other two 
vignettes there was no interaction effect of scale and 
option.
Discussion
Which scale do GPs prefer?
The answer to this first research question is that altogether 
the GPs in our study were not partial to any scale. We did 
find that less experienced GPs preferred words, and more 
experienced GPs favoured numbers. This is in line with 
the observations made by the experts whose probability 
assessments we elicited for the oesophagus network (see 
above), that people who are less knowledgeable about
(part of) a domain and thus more uncertain, prefer to use 
words to express this uncertainty, rather than numbers 
with their seemingly precise meaning.
Does the type o f scale affect GPs' assessments and 
confidence?
We found that the type of scale used did not seem to affect 
the probability and confidence assessments. Confidence 
was generally found to be quite high. Although this study 
was not designed to test accuracy of assessments, the 
agreement between GPs in probability assessments over 
the three scales, suggests that the type of scale used will 
not affect the accuracy. This is in line with our previous 
findings (see [17]).
Does the type o f scale influence unpacking effects?
As all our multiple diagnoses vignettes included more 
than two hypotheses, it is not surprising that subadditivity 
was found to be a general phenomenon [6]. The extent of 
additional subadditivity due to unpacking did not, in gen­
eral, seem to depend on the scale used. From our analyses 
for vignette 3, however, we conclude that use of the verbal 
response scale involves a risk of significantly more overes­
timation upon unpacking.
Tab le  3: Probab ility  and confidence: M ean probab ility  and confidence assessments (plus standard deviations) fo r th e  sim ple vignettes, 
per scale type
Vignette
probability Confidence
verbal double numerical verbal double numerical
4 69 (16.7) 65 (20.0) 74 (l 8.3) 82 (l 2.2) 83 (l 2.5) 8 l ( l7.2)
5 40 (22.5) 47 (22.3) 4 l (23.2) 63 (22.9) 73 (2 1.5) 68 (2 l. l)
6 58 (27.2) 69 (22.3) 66 (l 8.2) 83 ( l l.5 ) 80 (l 4.9) 72 (2l.0)
7 42 (2 1.6) 42 ( 17.4) 44 (2 1.5) 78 (l 3.4) 77 (l 7.2) 76 (l8.7)
8 54 (22.l) 44 (22.0) 4 l (2 1.4) 80 ( l 6.9) 74 (24.l) 76 ( l8 . l)
9 15 (7.0) 17 ( 10.5) l4  (l 2.2) 89 (5.8) 86 ( l 4.2) 89 (7.5)
10 32 (19.6) 35 ( 19.0) 34 (20.4) 82 (l 4.8) 77 (l 4.6) 77 ( l6.0)
11 49 (l9.3) 46 (2 1.0) 4 l (20.8) 76 (l 8.5) 76 (l 5.4) 72 (l9.4)
12 40 (l7.5) 43 (2 1.5) 40 (2 1.8) 8 l ( l 2.9) 82 ( l 5.0) 76 (l5.4)
13 80 (24.2) 72 (23.9) 76 (24.8) 88 (l 4.2) 80 (24.4) 86 (l4.4)
14 90 (l6.9) 94 (7.2) 85 (22.4) 92 (l 0.7) 93 (9.4) 92 (8.0)
15 57 (33.l) 62 (28.7) 76 (l 8.9) 87 ( l2 . l) 88 (l 2.5) 89 ( l l.6 )
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vignette 1 vignette 2 vignette 3
option scale short list (n = 32) long list (n = 54) short list (n = 62) long list (n = 24) short list (n = 42) long list (n =
verbal 18 (4.8) 3 1 (2 1.6) l0  (8.6) 9 (8.l) 59 (26.7) 50 (24.9)
A double 24 (21.5) 30 ( 14.7) 9 (6.6) 7 (5.6) 59 (23.6) 66 (20.2)
numerical 29 (22.7) 28 (2 1.0) 8 (4.6) 4 (0.9) 65 (26.9) 6l (25.2)
total 25 (l9.9) 30 ( 19.3) 9 (6.8) 6 (5.2) 62 (25.5) 58 (24.0)
verbal 36 (20.4) 28 ( 15.3) 82 ( 13.9) 89 ( 13.8) 27 ( 10.3) 28 ( l 6.0)
B double 28 (l5.6) 32 ( l8 . l) 75 (29.4) 72 (23.l) l9  ( 14.4) 29 (l 6.9)
numerical 30 (22 .4) 26 (20.4) 8 l (9.6) 80 ( 10.7) 2 l ( 14.5) 26 ( l5 . l)
total 31 (20.l) 29 ( 17.4) 79 (2 l. l) 78 ( 18.8) 22 (l 3.4) 28 (l 5.8)
verbal 63 (22.4) l2 l (36.3) 32 ( 17.7) 96 (25.3) 46 (29.3) l28 (50.4)
O double 76 (l5.2) l30 (39.0) 37 (26.8) 85 (3 1.4) 39 (23.7) l08 (38.9)
numerical 63 (l2.9) l l 7 (53.5) 28 (26.6) 74 (66.0) 30 (24.6) 88 (60.2)
total 66 (l 6.3) 123 (4 1.7) 33 (24.2) 84 (43.2) 37 (26.l) l l2  (50.6)
We can compare our results for vignette 1 to those given 
by Redelmeier et al's subjects (in [6]) to this same 
vignette. Our subjects overestimated the option O in the 
long list much more (mean of 123) than Redelmeier's 
(mean of 69; see [6]). Although their subjects still showed 
unpacking effects (option O's assessment increased from
50 in the packed version to 69 in the unpacked version), 
possibly Redelmeier's exhortation to make sure that the 
estimates add up to no more than 100% was stronger than 
our implicit statement that the options were mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive: "Given that the patient has only 
one of the following illnesses...". Indeed, if we rescale the 
assessments we found to a 0%-100% scale, we find the 
same mean assessments as Redelmeier et al.
Although our results show that in general it does not mat­
ter which of the three response scales is used whenever a 
probability response scale is chosen as supporting tool, 
remarks made indicate that individual preferences do 
exist. Subjects who preferred the verbal scale, said for 
example: "I feel more at ease with words; I don't really 
work with numerical assessments myself", and "I can't do 
much with numbers; words are much more meaningful to 
me". Also: "I feel the numbers force me to give a more pre­
cise answer, it's more gradual with words." Others, who 
preferred the numerical scale, remarked for example: "I 
thought the words were disturbing.", "I would even prefer 
a blank line."
Those with a preference for the numerical scale did see the 
advantage of words, though: "As an introduction, it is 
nicer to see words too, after that I don't look at them any­
more", as well as the disadvantages: "Words carry with 
them a stronger suggestion that something is almost 
impossible, while in practice you do have to take the pos­
sibility into account. I found I tended to go higher on the 
scale." These and similar thoughts about the conse­
quences made them prefer numbers: "Words are more 
exact for me, but take longer and are more difficult to 
process, I think." It is interesting that another GP, who 
also preferred numbers, said that "Numbers are more 
exact and less dependent on subjective interpretation." So 
words are more exact to some, and numbers are more 
exact to others.
Conclusion
We conclude that the different types of probability scale 
are equally suitable for supporting probability assess­
ments. In addition, we advise that to counter subadditiv­
ity subjects should estimate the whole distribution of 
options together, and it should be enforced that the esti­
mates add up to exactly 100%. To diminish unpacking 
effects, options should describe well-defined events and 
nothing vague like 'other'. We finally advise that the ver­
bal-numerical probability scale is a good option for aiding 
probability assessment: it offers numerical labels to those 
who prefer numbers and verbal labels to those who prefer 
words, thus accommodating both more and less experi­
enced professionals in both more and less uncertain situ­
ations. The double scale may also serve well in the 
communication of probabilistic information and risks, 
e.g. by doctors to patients. Since people differ in their pref­
erences for verbal or numerical terms but are willing to 
use both [33], the double scale might be the tool to give 
an on-the-spot translation of words into numbers and 
vice versa.
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